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Abstract 
We propose a formal framework for intelligent 
systems which can reason about scientific do­
mains, in particular about the carcinogenicity 
of chemicals, and we study its properties. Our 
framework is grounded in a philosophy of sci­
entific enquiry and discourse, and uses a model 
of dialectical argumentation. The formalism en­
ables representation of scientific uncertainty and 
conflict in a manner suitable for qualitative rea­
soning about the domain. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
We seek to build intelligent systems which can reason au­
tonomously about the risk of carcinogenicity of chemicals, 
drawing on whatever theoretical or experimental evidence 
is available. In earlier work (McBurney & Parsons 1999), 
reviewing the literature on methods of carcinogen risk as­
sessment, we listed the different types of evidence adduced 
to support these claims, which may be in the form of: ex­
perimental results on tissue cultures, animals or human epi­
demiological studies; analytical comparisons with known 
carcinogens; or explication of biomedical causal pathways. 
Evidence from these different sources may conflict, and 
carcinogen risk assessment usually involves the compar­
ison and resolution of multiple evidence (E.P.A. U.S. A 
1986; Graham, Green, & Roberts 1988). In representing 
this domain, it therefore seems appropriate to use some 
form of argumentation (so that the reasons for claims can 
be represented in association with the claims themselves), 
and within a dialectical framework (so that cases for and 
against a particular claim can be compared). In particular, 
dialectical argumentation enables the representation of un­
certainty in the underlying scientific knowledge base. This 
paper presents such a dialectical formalism for an intelli­
gent system, which we termed a Risk Agora in our earlier 
work. We begin by examining the nature of scientific dis­
course. 
2 SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE 
2.1 A MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY 
Our chosen application domain is a scientific one. To repre­
sent this domain, therefore, we seek to ground our formal­
ism in a philosophical model of scientific enquiry. Firstly, 
we require a theory of the nature of modem science. Fol­
lowing Pera (1994), we view the enterprise of science as 
a three-person dialogue, involving a scientific investiga­
tor, Nature and a skeptical scientific community. In Pera's 
model, the investigator proposes theoretical explanations of 
scientific phenomena and undertakes scientific experiments 
to test these. The experiments lead to "replies" from Na­
ture in the form of experimental evidence. However, Na­
ture's responses are not given directly or in a pure form, 
but are mediated through the third participant, the scien­
tific community, which interprets the evidence, undertakes 
a debate as to its meaning and implications, and eventually 
decides in favor or against proposed theoretical explana­
tions. The consequence of this model for our formalism is 
that we provide Nature with a formal role, but manifest it 
through those of the other participants. 
But Pera's model of modem science as a dialogue game 
could apply to many other human dialogues, most of which 
do not share science's success in explaining and predict­
ing natural phenomena. Our model of science therefore 
requires an explanation of its success. Some philosophers 
of science believe this is due to the application of univer­
sal principles of assessment of proposed scientific theo­
ries, such as the falsificationism of Popper or the confir­
mationism of Camap. However, we do not share these 
views, instead believing, with Feyerabend (1993), that the 
standards of assessment used by any scientific community 
are domain-, context- and time-dependent. This view, that 
there are neither universal nor objective standards by which 
scientific theories can be judged, was called "epistemolog­
ical anarchism" by Lakatos (Lakatos & Feyerabend 1999). 
Instead of universal principles of assessment of theories, 
we believe science's success arises in part from applying 
two normative principles of conduct: firstly, that every the-
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oretical explanation proposed by a scientific investigator is 
contestable by anyone; and secondly, that every theoretical 
explanation adopted by a scientific community is defeasi­
ble. In other words, all scientific theories, no matter how 
compelling, are always tentative, being held only until bet­
ter explanations are found, and anyone may propose these.1 
To build an intelligent system based on these principles, 
we therefore require a (normative) model of scientific 
discourse which enables contestation and defeasibility of 
claims. Our model has several components. At the high­
est level, we are attempting to model a discourse between 
reasonable, consenting scientists, who accept or reject ar­
guments only on the basis of their relative force. An in­
fluential model for debates of this type is the philosophy 
of Discourse Ethics developed by Habermas ( 1991) for de­
bates in ethical and moral domains. Our formalism there­
fore draws on Habermas, in particular his rules of discourse 
first fully articulated by Alexy (1990), and these form the 
basis of the desired properties of the Agora formalism pre­
sented later in this section.2 
Next, within this structure, we wish to be able to model 
dialogues in which different participants variously posit, 
assert, contest, justify, qualify and retract claims. To rep­
resent such activity requires a model of an argument, and 
we use Toulmin's (1958) model, within a dialectical frame­
work. To embody our belief in epistemological anarchism, 
we permit participants to contest any component of a sci­
entific argument: its premises; its rules of inference (Toul­
min 's "warrants"); its degrees of support (his "modalities"); 
and its consequences. We believe this is exactly what real 
scientists do when confronted with new theoretical expla­
nations of natural phenomena (Feyerabend 1993). When 
a scientific claim is thus contested, its proponent may re­
spond, not only by retracting it, but by qualifying it in some 
way, perhaps reducing its scope of applicability. Naess 
( 1966) called this process "precizating", and we seek to 
enable such responses in the system. We thus ground our 
formalism for the Agora in a model of scientific discourse 
as dialectical argumentation. 3 
2.2 DESIRED AGORA PROPERTIES 
As mentioned, we desire our Agora formalism to satisfy the 
rules for a reasoned discourse proposed by Alexy (1990), 
which are listed here. In restating these, we have modi­
fied and re-ordered them slightly, and have ignored rules 
which deal specifically with discussion of ethical matters. 
Also, because our formalism is intended for debate regard­
ing only one chemical at a time, we have ignored Alexy's 
1These two principles are each necessary to explain science's 
success, but not sufficient. 
2 Alexy's rules have some similarity with Grice's (1975) Max­
ims for Conversation. 
3Further details of our philosophy of science are contained in 
(McBurney & Parsons 2000b). 
rules regarding the relevance of utterances. We have also 
added a property concerning precization. 
Pl Anyone may participate in the Agora, and they may 
execute dialogue moves at any time, subject only to 
move-specific conditions (defined below). 
P2 Participation entails acceptance of the semantics for the 
logical language used, and of the associated modality 
(degrees of support) dictionaries. 
P3 Any participant may assert any claim or consequence 
of a claim, but may do so only when they have a 
grounded argument for the claim (respectively, a con­
sequential argument from the claim). 
P4 Any participant may question or challenge any claim 
or any consequence of a claim. 
PS Any participant who asserts a claim (respectively, 
a consequence of a claim) must provide a valued 
grounded argument for that claim (respectively, a val­
ued consequential argument from the claim) if queried 
or challenged by another participant. 
P6 Any participant may question or challenge the grounds, 
the rules of inference or the modalities for any claim. 
P7 Whenever a participant asserts a valued grounded argu­
ment for a claim (or a valued consequential argument 
from a claim), any other participant may assert a val­
ued grounded argument (respectively, a valued conse­
quential argument) for the same claim with different 
dictionary values. 
PS A participant who has provided a grounded argument 
for a claim which has been challenged should be able 
to respond by qualifying (precizating) the original 
claim or argument. 
P9 Any participant who provides a grounded argument 
for, or a consequential argument from, a claim is 
not required to provide further defence if no counter­
arguments are provided by other participants. 
PlO No participant may contradict him or herself. 
3 THE RISK AGORA FORMALISM 
3.1 PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 
We begin by assuming the system is intended to represent 
debate regarding the carcinogenicity of a specific chemi­
cal, and that statements concerning this can be expressed 
in a propositional language £, whose well-formed formu­
lae (wffs) we denote by lower-case Greek letters. Subsets 
of £ (i.e. sets of wffs) are denoted by upper-case Greek 
letters, and £ is assumed closed under the usual connec­
tives. We assume multiple modes of inference (warrants) 
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are possible, these being denoted by 1- i. These may include 
non-deductive modes of reasoning, and we make no pre­
sumptions regarding their validity in any truth model. We 
assume a finite set of debate participants, denoted by Pi. 
who are permitted to introduce new wffs and new modes of 
inference at any time. We denote Nature, in its role in the 
debate, by PN. 
Definition 1: A grounded argument for a claim 0, de­
noted A(-+ 0), is a 3-tuple (G,R,O), where G = 
(0o, 01, 81,02, . . .  , 0n-2, On-1, 0n-1) is an ordered se­
quence of wffs ()i and possibly -empty sets of wffs 0i, with 
n � 1 and with R = (h, h, . . .  , 1-n) an ordered sequence 
of inference rules such that: 
In other words, each () k ( k = 1, ... , n - 1) is derived from 
the preceding wff ()k_1 and set of wffs 0k-1 as a result of 
the application of the k-th rule of inference, 1-k. The rules 
of inference in any argument may be non-distinct. We call 
the set {Ok-1} u 0k_1 the grounds (or premises) for Ok. 
Definition 2: A consequential argument from a claim (), 
denoted A(O --+ ), is a 3-tuple (0, R, C), where C = 
(0o, 01, 81, 02, . . .  , 0n-2, On-1, 0n-1, On) is an ordered 
sequence of wffs ()i and possibly -empty sets of wffs 0i, with 
n � 1, and with R = (l-1, h, . . .  , 1-n) an ordered se­
quence of inference rules such that: 
On-1, 0n-1 1-n On. 
In other words, the wffs ()k in C are derivations from () 
arising from the successive application of the rules of in­
ference in R, and we call each ()k in C a consequence of 
0. 
In order that participants may effectively state and con­
test degrees of commitment to claims, we require a com­
mon dictionary of degrees of commitment or support (what 
Toulrnin called "modalities"). Our formalism will support 
any agreed dictionary, whether quantitative (such as a set of 
probability values or belief measures) or qualitative (such 
as non-numeric symbols or linguistic qualifiers), provided 
there is a partial order on its elements. We define dictionar­
ies for modalities for claims, grounds, consequences and 
rules of inference. 
Definition 3: Four modality dictionaries are defined as fol­
lows, each being a (possibly infinite) set of elements having 
a partial order. The claims dictionary is denoted by Vc, the 
grounds dictionary by Va, the consequences dictionary by 
VQ, and the inference dictionary by VI. 
Because claims, grounds and consequences are all elements 
of the same language .C, two or more of the dictionaries 
Vc, Va and VQ may be the same. However, a distinct 
dictionary will generally be required for VI. 4 Because of 
our belief in epistemological anarchism, we do not specify 
rules of assignment of dictionary labels by participants in 
the Agora. In particular, the labels assigned to the conclu­
sions and consequences of arguments are not constrained 
by those assigned to premises or rules of inference. 
Example I: The generic argumentation dictionary defined 
for assessment of risk by (Krause et al. 1998) is an exam­
ple of a linguistic dictionary for statements about claims, 
grounds or consequences, comprising the set: {Certain, 
Confirmed, Probable, Plausible, Supported, Open}. The 
elements of this dictionary are listed in descending order, 
with each successive label indicating a weaker belief in the 
claim. 
Example 2: Two examples of Inference Dictionaries are 
VI= {Valid, Invalid} and VI= {Acceptable, Sometimes 
Acceptable, Open, Not Acceptable}. 
Definition 4: A valued grounded argument for a claim 
(), denoted A(-+ O,D), is a 4-tuple (G,R,O,D), where 
( G, R, 0) is a grounded argument for () and D 
(do,d1, . . .  ,dn-1,do,r1,r2, ... ,rn) is an ordered se­
quence of labels and vectors of labels, with each di a vector 
of dictionary labels from Vc (fori = 0, . . . , n - 1), with 
do E Vc and with ri E VI (fori = 1, . . .  , n). Each 
vector di comprises those values of the Claims Dictionary 
assigned to grounds { ()i} u 0i, the element do is that value 
of the Claims Dictionary assigned to () and each element 
ri is that value of the Inference Dictionary assigned to 1-i. 
A valued consequential argument from a claim 0, denoted 
A(() --+,D), is defined similarly . 
3.2 DISCOURSE RULES 
We next define the rules for discourse participants, building 
on the definitions above. Moves are denoted by 2-ary or 
3-ary functions of the form name(Pi: . ), where the first 
argument denotes the participant executing the move. If the 
move responds to an earlier move by another participant, 
that earlier move is the second argument. Arguments are 
separated by colons. In Section 4, we will show that these 
rules give operational effect to the Desired Properties. 
4In (McBurney & Parsons 2000c), we model degrees of ac­
ceptability of inference rules. 
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Rule 1: Query and Assertion Moves 
1.1 Pose Claim: Any participant Pi at any time may 
move: 
pose(Pi :---+ (}?) 
which asks the Agora if there is a grounded argument 
for e. 
1.2 Propose Claim: Any participant Pi at any time may 
propose a claim with move: 
propose(Pi : ( (}, de)) 
where(} E £ and de E Vc, which informs the Agora 
that Pi has a valued grounded argument for(}, and has 
assigned it a modality of de. 
1.3 Assert Claim: Any participant Pi at any time may 
assert a claim with move: 
assert(Pi : ((},de)) 
where (} is a wff and de E Vc, which informs the 
Agora that Pi has a valued grounded argument for (}, 
which she believes is compelling. 
1.4 Query Claim: Whenever a propose or assert move 
relating to ((},de) has been made by participant Pi. 
any other participant Pi may move: 
query(Pj : propose(Pi : (0, de))) 
or 
query(Pj : assert(Pi: (O,de))). 
These ask participant Pi to provide her valued 
grounded argument for 0, which she must provide im­
mediately with move: 
show_arg(Pi : A(---+ 0, D)). 
1.5 Show Grounded Argument: Any participant Pi may 
at any time provide a valued grounded argument for 0 
with the move: 
show_arg(Pi: A(-+ O,D)). 
1.6 Pose Consequence: A participant Pk may at any time 
move: 
pose_cons(Pk : () ---+?) 
which asks the Agora if there is a consequential argu­
ment from 0. 
1. 7 Propose Consequence: Similarly to Propose Claim, a 
participant may move: 
propose_cons(Pi : (0, ¢, d¢)) 
where ¢ is a consequence of 0. 
1.8 Assert Consequence: Similarly to Assert Claim, a 
participant may move: 
asserLcons(Pi : (0, ¢, d¢)) 
where ¢ is a consequence of 0. 
1.9 Query Consequence: Similarly to Query Claim, a 
participant may move: 
query_cons(Pj : propose(Pi: (0, ¢, d¢))). 
1.10 Show Consequential Argument: Any participant Pi 
may at any time provide a valued consequential argu­
ment from 0 with the move: 
show_cons(Pi : A(O ---+,D)). 
1.11 Propose Mode of Inference: Any participant Pi at 
any time may move: 
where I-t is a mode of inference and r t E V 1. This 
move informs the community that participant Pi be­
lieves that I-t is a mode of inference of strength at least 
Tt. 
Note that the query and assertions rules are not symmet­
ric between grounded and consequential arguments; partic­
ipants may only propose or assert claims for which they 
have grounded arguments, but they need not necessarily 
have considered the consequences of these claims. Next, 
we explicitly define the Contest Claim rule, with other con­
testation rules being defined similarly. For brevity in the 
following, we sometimes write A for A(---+ (},D). 
Rule 2: Contestation Moves 
2.1 Contest Claim: Whenever propose or assert relating 
to (0, de) has been moved by participant Pi. any other 
participant Pi may contest this by moving: 
contest(Pj : propose(Pi : (B, de))) 
or 
contest(Pj :assert(Pi : (0, de))). 
If any participant Pk subsequently queries this contes­
tation with: 
query(Pk : contest(Pj : propose(Pi : (0, de)))) 
(or likewise for assert), participant Pi must respond 
immediately, either with an assignment of an alterna­
tive modality d0 for claim 0, thus: 
propose(Pi : (0, d0)) 
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or 
assert(Pj : (B, d�)) 
(where d� =/: do), or with a stronger assertion of the 
negation of B, thus: 
propose(Pj : (•B,d�)) 
or 
assert(Pj : (•B,d�)) 
(where d� >do). 
2.2 Contest Ground: 
contesLground(Pj :show...arg(Pi : A : (Bt, do,)). 
2.3 Contest Inference: 
contesLinf(Pj : show...arg(Pi : A : f-t)). 
2.4 Contest Modality: 
contest.mod(Pj : show...arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D))). 
2.5 Contest Consequence: 
contesLcons(Pj : show_cons(Pi : A: (Bt, do,))). 
Rule 3: Participant Resolution Moves 
3.1 Accept Proposed Claim: Whenever a claim has been 
proposed by Pi and its grounds demonstrated by mov-
ing: 
show...arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D)), 
any other participant P1 may declare that they accept 
the proposed claim, with move: 
accept_prop(Pj : show...arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D))). 
This move is identical with the sequence: 
propose(Pj : ( (}, do)) 
show..arg(Pj : A(--+ B, D)). 
3.2 Accept Asserted Claim: Similarly to accept .prop: 
accept..assert(Pj : show...arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D))). 
3.3 Change Modalities: Any participant Pi who proposes 
or asserts a claim for(}, and follows this with a demon­
stration of a valued grounded argument for(} by mov-
ing: 
show...arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D)), 
may subsequently revise her assignment of modalities 
with a later move of: 
show..arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D' )), 
where D' =/: D. Likewise, declarations of modal be­
liefs expressed in other moves (e.g. in accept..assert) 
may also be revised by subsequently executing the 
same move with a different set of dictionary values. 
3.4 Accept Mode of Inference: Similarly to accept .prop: 
accepLinf(Pj : propose_inf(Pi: (f-t,rt))). 
3.5 Accept Consequence: Similarly to accept .prop: 
accepU:ons(Pj : show_cons(Pi : A(B --+,D))). 
3.6 Precizate Claim: Any participant Pi who proposes or 
asserts a claim for (}, and follows this with a demon­
stration of a valued grounded argument for (} by: 
show..arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D)) 
may subsequently qualify her argument with: 
prec(Pi : show...arg(Pi : A(--+ B, D)): A' (--+ B, D')) 
where A' (--+ (}, D') is an argument for(} identical with 
A(--+ B, D) except that: (a) it begins from ground <I> U 
80 instead of 00, where <I> is not equal to { B} nor to 
any ground of(}, and (b) D' may be different to D. 
3.7 Retract Claim: Any participant Pi who asserts: 
assert(Pi: (B,do)) 
may at any time subsequently withdraw the claim by: 
retract(Pi: assert(Pi: (B,do))). 
Likewise, for those claims by others accepted by Pi. 
3.8 No contradiction: Any participant Pi who asserts (or 
accepts an assertion for) (} may not at any time subse­
quently assert (or accept an assertion for) -.(}, unless 
they have in the interim moved: 
retract(Pi : assert(Pi : ( (}, do))) 
(or, respectively, its equivalent for accepted claims). 
3.3 DIALOGUE RULES 
Definition 5: A Dialogue is a finite sequence of discourse 
moves by participants in the Agora, in accordance with the 
rules above. 
As in (Hamblin 1971; Walton & Krabbe 1995; Amgoud, 
Maudet, & Parsons 2000), we define sets called Commit­
ment Stores which contain the proposals and assertions 
made by participants, both individually and for the Agora 
as a community, and track these as they change. 
Definition 6: The commitment store of player Pi, 
i = 1, 2, . .. , denoted CS(Pi), is a possibly empty set 
{(B,do) I (} E £, do E Vc}. Each do is the claim dic­
tionary value assigned by Pi to B. 
The values in participants' stores are updated by the fol­
lowing rule: 
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Rule 4: Participant Commitment Store Update: When­
ever participant Pi executes the moves 
propose(Pi : ((),do)), 
accept_prop(Pi: propose(Pj: ((),do))), 
assert(Pi: (e,do)), 
accept..assert(Pi: assert(Pj :((),do))) 
or their equivalents, then the tuple ((),do) is inserted into 
CS (Pi). Whenever participant Pi executes a retraction 
move for ((), do), the tuple ((), do) is removed fromCS (Pi). 
Similarly, whenever Pi executes a Change Modality move 
for ((), do), the value of ((), do) in C S (P i) is revised. 
We next define an analogous concept for Nature, with 
claims inserted into Nature's Commitment Store on the ba­
sis of the debate at that point in the Agora. This could be 
achieved in a number of ways. For example, a skeptical 
community could define Nature's modality for a claim() to 
be the minimum claim modality assigned by any of those 
Participants claiming or supporting (). A credulous com­
munity could instead assign to Nature the maximum claim 
modality assigned by any of the participants to e. Varia­
tions on these approaches could utilize majority opinion or 
weighted voting schemes. 
Because we wish to model dialectical discourse, we have 
instead chosen to assign Nature's modalities on the basis 
of the existence of arguments for and against the claim. 
To do this, we draw on the generic argumentation dictio­
nary for debates about carcinogenicity of chemicals pre­
sented in (Krause et al. 1998), which is based on Toulmin 's 
(1958) schema. We begin by defining certain relationships 
between arguments and then the Claims Dictionary for Na­
ture. 
Definition 7: An argument A( -t () ) = ( G, R, () ) is con­
sistent if G = (eo, ()1, e1, ()2, ... , en-2, ()n-1, en-d is 
consistent, that is if there do not exist a, (3 E eo U { ()1} U 
e1 u {()2} u 0 0 0 u en-1 such that ·f3 is a consequence of 
a. 
Definition 8: Let A(-t ()) = (G,R,()) and B(-t 
¢>) = (H, S, ¢>) be two arguments, where G 
(eo,e1, e1, ()2, . . .  ,()n-1, en-d· We say that B(-t ¢>) re­
buts A( -t ()) if¢> = ...,()_ We say that B( -t ¢>) undercuts 
A(-t () ) if,for somea E eou{el}ue1u{e2}u ... uen-1> 
a= •¢>. 
Definition 9: The claims dictionary for Nature is the set 
Vc,N = {Certain, Confirmed, Probable, Plausible, Sup­
ported, Open}. 
Definition 10: The commitment store of Nature, denoted 
CS(PN), is a non-empty set{(e,do,N) I () E £, do,N E 
Vc,N }. Each do,N is the claim modality assigned by the 
Agora community on Nature's behalf to (), in accordance 
with the next two rules. 
Rule 5: Nature's Modalities: The modality do,N of Na­
ture for the claim () is assigned as follows: 
• If () is a wff for which no grounded argument has yet 
been provided by a participant, then do,N is assigned 
the value Open. 
• If() is a wff for which at least one grounded argument 
has been provided by a participant, then do,N is as­
signed the value Supported. 
• If() is a wff for which a grounded and consistent argu­
ment has been provided by a participant, then do,N is 
assigned the value Plausible. 
• If () is a wff for which a grounded and consistent ar­
gument has been provided by a participant, and for 
which no rebutting arguments have been provided, 
then do,N is assigned the value Probable. 
• If () is a wff for which a grounded and consistent ar­
gument has been provided by a participant, and for 
which neither rebutting nor undercutting arguments 
have been provided by participants, then do,N is as­
signed the value Confirmed. 
• If () is a logical tautology, then do ,N is assigned the 
value Certain. 
Rule 6: Nature Commitment Store Update: The entries 
in CS(PN) are updated after each legal move by Agora 
participants. 
3.4 ARCHITECTURE AND USER INTERFACE 
We anticipate the Risk Agora system being used to rep­
resent a completed or on-going scientific debate, but not in 
real-time. Once instantiated with a specific knowledge base 
in this way, the Agora could be used for a number of differ­
ent purposes, which led us (McBurney & Parsons 1999), to 
propose a layered architecture for the Agora, corresponding 
to these different functions. The main purposes to be ful­
filled are: (a) automated reasoning to find arguments for, 
and the consequences of, particular claims; (b) compari­
son of the various arguments for and against a claim; and 
(c) development of an overall case for a claim, coherently 
combining all the arguments for and against it. 
4 AGORA PROPERTIES 
The rules defined in the previous section were intended to 
operationalize the desired Agora properties of Section 2.2. 
We now verify that this is indeed the case. 
Theorem I: The Agora sy stem defined in Section 3 has 
Properties P 1 through P 10. 
Proof. This is straightforward, from the definitions of the 
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permitted moves. Thus, Properties P l  and P2 are fulfilled 
through the overall system design; Property P3 by Rules 
1.1-1.3 and 1.6-1.8; Property P4 by Rules 1.4, 1.9, 2.1 and 
2.5; Property P5 by Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.8 and 1.10; 
Property P6 by Rules 2.2-2.4; Property P7 by Rules 3.1-
3.5; Property P8 by Rule 3.6; Property P9 by Rules 1 and 
2; and Property P lO by Rule 3.8. 0 
Moreover, we can use the definition of the claim modalities 
for Nature provided by Rule 5 to construct a valuation func­
tion on wffs and to define a notion of "proof" of claims, as 
follows. 
Definition 11: Natural valuation is a function v N defined 
from the set of wffs of C to the set {0, 1 }, such thatv N(B) = 
1 precisely when do,N = Confirmed; otherwise, vN(B) = 
0. 
Definition 12: A provisional proof for a claim B is a 
grounded and consistent argument for B for which neither 
rebuttal nor undercutting arguments exist. 
Our belief in the defeasibility of all scientific claims leads 
us to use the term "provisional proof" rather than "proof." 
Likewise, we can think of a natural valuation equal to 1 as 
signifying "Currently Accepted as True" (or "Defeasibly 
True") and 0 as "Not Currently Accepted as True." Our 
definition of natural valuation thus says that a claim is de­
feasibly true iff there are no arguments attacking it. We 
could readily define additional valuation functions which 
capture degrees of conviction regarding the truth of claims, 
mapping, for instance, to Probable or to Plausible. With 
the definitions above, we can now prove soundness of pro­
visional proofs in the Agora, with respect to the natural 
valuation function. 
Theorem 2: With the notion of provisional proof, the Agora 
is consistent and complete with respect to the Natural Val­
uation Function v N, provided that all grounded arguments 
for claims are eventually asserted by some Participant. 
Proof. Consistency here says that all claims B for which 
there exists a provisional proof are also assigned a valu­
ation of 1 by the function VN. Completeness says, con­
versely, that all claims B which are assigned a valuation of 
1 by v N also have a provisional proof. Both of these follow 
from our definitions of v N and of provisional proof, unless 
a consistent grounded argument for a claim B exists but is 
not asserted by any Participant. 0 
The model of science we have adopted asserts that scien­
tific claims are regarded as "defeasibly true" only when 
the relevant scientific community agrees to so regard them. 
(After all, even if a transcendent truth exists, science has 
no privileged means of accessing it.) Our definition of nat­
ural valuation is in effect a proxy for the scientific commu­
nity's opinion on the truth of a claim. Accordingly, The­
orem 2 says that the provisional proof procedure neither 
under-generates nor over-generates defeasibly true claims, 
provided all grounded arguments for claims are eventually 
asserted. 
5 EXAMPLE 
To illustrate these ideas we present a simple and hypothet­
ical example of an Agora debate. In a real debate, partic­
ipants would be free to introduce supporting evidence and 
modes of inference at any time. For reasons of space, in this 
example we first list the statements and modes of inference 
to be asserted, labeled K l  through K4, and R l  through R3, 
respectively, about a chemical X: 
Kl: X is produced by the human body naturally (i.e. it is 
endogenous). 
K2: X is endogenous in rats. 
K3: An endogenous chemical is not carcinogenic. 
K4: Bioassay experiments applying X to rats result in sig­
nificant carcinogenic effects. 
Rl (And Introduction): Given a wff ¢ and a wff B, we 
may infer the wff ( ¢ 1\ B). 
R2 (Modus Ponens): Given a wff ¢ and the wff (¢-+B), 
we may infer the wff B. 
R3: If a chemical is found to be carcinogenic in an ani­
mal species, then we may infer it to be carcinogenic 
in humans. 
We now give an example of an Agora dialogue concern­
ing the statement: X is carcinogenic to humans, which 
we denote by ¢. The moves are numbered Ml ,  M2, .. . , 
in sequence, and for simplicity we assume the participants 
are using the claims dictionary of Example 1, abbreviated 
to { Cert, Conf, Prob, Plaus, Supp, Open}, and the in­
ference dictionary V1 = {Val, Inval}. Before any dis­
course move is made, Nature's modality for this claim is 
dq,,N = Open, as is its modality for •¢. Ignoring claims 
about any other chemicals, we thus have at commencement 
thatCS(PN) = {(¢,0pen),(•¢, 0pen)}. Through the 
dialogue, we show the contents of Nature's commitment 
store as it changes, in steps numbered NCSO, NCSl ,  .. . 
NCSO: CS(PN) ={(¢, Open), (•¢, Open)}. 
Ml: assert(P1 : (¢,Con!)). 
M2: query(P2 : assert(P1 : (¢,Con!))). 
M3: show....arg(P1 : (K4, R3, ¢, ( Conf, Val, Con!))). 
NCSl: CS(PN) ={(¢, Con!), (•¢, Open)}. 
M4: contest(P2 :assert(P1 : (¢, Con!))). 
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M5: query(P3 :contest(P2 :assert(P1 : (¢;,Con!)))) 
M6: propose(P2 : ( •¢;, Plaus) ). 
M7: query(P1 :propose(P2 : ( •¢>, Plaus ))). 
M8: show...nrg(P2 : ((Kl, K3), R2, •¢>, 
( Conf, Prob, Val, Plaus))). 
NCS2: CS( PN) = {(¢;,Plaus),(•¢;,Plaus)}. 
M9: contest_ground(P 4 : 
show...nrg(P2 : ((Kl, K3), R2, •¢;, 
(Conf,Prob, Val,Plaus)) : (K3,Prob))). 
MlO: show...nrg(P4: ((K2, K4), RI, -.K3, 
( Conf, Con/, Val, Con!)) ) 
NCS3: CS( PN) = { ( ¢>, Plaus), ( •¢>, Plaus)}. 
Observe that Participant P4 in Move MlO, by providing an 
argument for -.K3, undercuts the argument presented for 
¢> by Participant P2 in Move MS. We can also observe the 
changes in the Natural Valuation of ¢; through the course 
of this debate. At the start, we have VN(¢>) = 0, which 
changes to vN(¢) = 1 after Move M3, since then de,N = 
Con/. However, after Move M8, de,N = Plaus, so once 
again VN(¢>) = 0. 
6 DISCUSSION 
Characterization of scientific discourse as dialectical argu­
mentation is not new. Rescher ( 1977) claims to have been 
the first to propose a dialectical framework for modeling 
the progress of scientific inquiry, and Pera's (1994) work is 
also a dialectical approach to science. Among argumen­
tation theorists, Freeman (1991) also discusses scientific 
discourse in his study of argument structure. Both Carlson 
(1983) and Walton and Krabbe (1995) aim to model generic 
dialogues, but their focus is (respectively) on question-and­
answer and persuasion dialogues. In addition, neither for­
malism explicitly permits degrees of support for commit­
ments to be expressed, which our formalism does. 
None of these works appears intended for encoding in in­
telligent systems. Within AI, intelligent systems for scien­
tific domains have used argumentation for some time (e.g. 
Fox, Krause, & Ambler 1992). However, these applications 
have typically involved monolectical rather than dialectical 
argumentation. More recently, Haggith (1996) developed 
a dialectical argumentation formalism and applied the re­
sulting system to a carcinogenicity debate. However, the 
primary focus of her work was on knowledge representa­
tion in generic domains of conflict, and so her formalism 
is not grounded in an explicit philosophy of science. The 
work of Amgoud, Maudet, & Parsons (2000) is closest in 
approach to that presented here (and we have drawn upon 
their formalism), but it is focused on negotiation dialogues, 
agam m a generic context. Their formalism only permits 
two participants, although this would be relatively easy to 
amend. As with Haggith's system, their formalism does not 
permit debate over the rules of inference used. Recent legal 
argumentation systems, such as those of Verheij ( 1999), do 
permit this. 
Our formal definition of the Risk Agora enables contes­
tation and defeasibility of scientific claims. Our system 
therefore operationalizes the two normative principles of 
conduct for scientific discourses presented in Section 2.1. 
We are currently exploring a number of refinements to the 
Agora. Firstly, Rehg ( 1997) has demonstrated the ratio­
nality of incorporation of rhetorical devices (such as epi­
deictic speech and appeals to emotions) in dialectical argu­
ment and decision-making, and we seek a means to incor­
porate such devices in the Agora. This would not be novel: 
the argumentation system of Reed ( 1998), for example, al­
lows for the modeling of rhetorical devices, although in a 
monolectical context. Secondly, using the Agora in a de­
liberative context would require incorporation of values for 
the projected consequences and the development of an ap­
propriate qualitative decision-theory, as in (Fox & Parsons 
1998; Parsons & Green 1999). 
We believe the Risk Agora has a number of potential bene­
fits. Firstly, by articulating precisely the arguments used to 
assert carcinogenicity, gaps in knowledge and weaknesses 
in arguments can be identified more readily. Such iden­
tification could be used to prioritize bio-medical research 
efforts for the particular chemical. Secondly, by explor­
ing the logical consequences of claims, the Risk Agora can 
serve a social maieutic function, making explicit knowl­
edge which may only be latent. Thirdly, once instantiated 
with the details of a particular debate, the system could 
be used for self-education by others outside the scientific 
community concerned. Indeed, it could potentially form 
the basis for the making of regulatory or societal deci­
sions on the issues in question (e.g. Should the chemical 
be banned?) , and thereby give practical effect to notions 
of deliberative democracy (McBurney & Parsons 2000a; 
2000 In press). Finally, with argumentation increasingly 
being used in the design of multi-agent systems (Parsons, 
Sierra, & Jennings 1998), the formalism presented here 
could readily be adapted for deliberative dialogues between 
independent software agents. 
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